Will Internationalization Lead to a Convergence of National Economic Policies? by Unger, Brigitte & Klatzer, Elisabeth
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Brigitte Unger and Elisabeth Klatzer
Will Internationalization Lead to a Convergence of National Economic
Policies?
Paper
Original Citation:
Unger, Brigitte and Klatzer, Elisabeth (1992) Will Internationalization Lead to a Convergence of
National Economic Policies? Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 12. WU Vienna
University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Vienna.
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/6286/
Available in ePubWU: May 2018
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
Address of the authors: 
Elisabeth Klatzer 
Department of Economics 
WILL INTERNA TIONALIZA T/ON LEAD 
TO A CONVERGENCE 
OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES? 
ELISABETH KLA TZER AND BRIGITTE UNGER 
Working Paper No. 12 
June 1992 
11H1i1l1!]li1111 
+J18246907 
Brigitte Unger 
Department of Economics 
Vienna University of Economics and 
Business Administration 
Vienna University of Economics and 
Business Administration 
Augasse 2-6 
A-1090 Wien 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: 43-1-313 36/ext 4514 
Fax: 43-1-313 36-728 
Augasse 2-6 
1090 Wien 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: 43-1-313 36/ext 4510 
Fax: 43-1-313 36-728 
Fo~ helP_ful comments we are grateful to Gerhard Munduch, Ewald Nowotny, Herbert ~alther (Vie~na 
Umvers,ty o( Economics) and Franz Traxler (University of Vienna). Thanks to f:'ht/Jppe Schm,rrer 
(Stanford Umversity) who also gave us a lot of inspiring ideas for future work. ~pec,al tha~ks to Frans 
van Waarden (LJ_nf versity of Konstanz) who improved the sty~e ~f t~e paper qu,te substant,afly. Thanks 
to our student M,qana Djurdjevic for providing empirical matenal m time. 
-1 '{ ""'-
l. 
Introduction 
Internationalization especially the ongoing European 
integration is supposed to result in convergence of 
macroeconomic variables. There are two different views on how 
such a convergence will take place• One side argues that 
convergence will result out of breaking down borders between 
national economies. Economic outcomes would then be the result 
of legal arrangements such as free factor mobility. There would 
therefore, be no need to set targets for the maximum deviatio~ 
of broad economic aggregates like inflation rates within the 
community, since the market would prod,uce an adjustment of data. 
The other side seems to be more sceptical about such an outcome 
and tries to fix ranges of acceptable deviations of economic 
variables within the Community. They attempt to fix economic 
facts by law and by legal commitments. The last Maastricht 
meeting can be seen as such an attempt. The need for convergence 
of economic variables as a precondition or at least as a target 
for the single market is stressed. Convergence would therefore 
be a precondition or a target but not an automatic result of 
integration. Voices in favor of fixing targets have certainly to 
do with the fear of big countries (like Germany) having to play 
an umbrella-role in the EC similar to the one the former Soviet 
union had to play for the smaller Eastern European countries. In 
fact, it can be shown, that small countries can take free rider 
positions (e.g. increasing their public debts at national 
financial markets) which cannot be sanctioned easily by big 
countries. 
In this paper we address th~ question differently: we want to 
find out empirically whether convergence of economic variables 
is a general trend of economies exposed to increased 
internationalization. Only then can we discuss whether 
convergence of economic policies is a precondition, a result or 
a desirable or avoidable option for the functioning of the 
economy. 
:r. some Theoretical Thoughts on the Convergence of Macroeconomic 
variables and the Choice of Indicators 
We measure internationalization by the degree of factor 
mobility, i.e. financial capital mobility, real capital mobility 
and labour mobility. The options for politics are changed when 
factor mobilities vary. In the ideal economists' world of 
perfect factor mobility, national policies would become 
unfeasible but at the same time superfluous: If financial and 
real capital went to its best use at infinite speed and if also 
labour were perfectly mobile - if e.g. a worker could be 
employed both in Portugal and in the U.S. - and if there were no 
barriers or restrictions to free trade, national economies wo~ld 
work perfectly from an allocative viewpoint. No national policy 
whatsoever can or should intervene in this "best of the worldS" · 
We would have a clear tendency towards convergence of 
macroeconomic variables. It should be stressed, nevertheless, 
that even under these perfect, harmonious conditions differences 
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t· nal or regional policies could persist. Social 
anong_tna iyostens and tax systems could e.g. differ if workers 
securi y s ) · d t 
h d "fferent "tastes". As Tiebout (1961 pointe ou , we would ave i . 1 - t d' have II islands" of different public po icy arrangemen s accor ing 
to people's preferences. 
y t factors are never perfectly mobile. In general, financial 
c:pital is more mobile than real capital ~hich,in t~rn exceeds 
the mobility of labour. This means that financial disturbances 
are more quickly transferred i~to other. cou~trie~ than 7eal 
phenomena. There was a rapid increase in financial capital 
cobility at the end.of the_1970s a~d - at least.th7o7etical~y -
there is no intrinsic barrier for it to become infinitely high, 
if one imagines a fully computerized financial system. Also real 
capital mobility has increased. Nevertheless, there are limits 
of further increase due to persistent political risk differences 
among countries and due to intrinsic barriers inherent in the 
very nature of real capital. These are its dependence on 
geographical nearness to raw material and consumer markets, high 
sunk costs and costs of transportation. Labour mobility (except 
for some specific high and for very low skilled jobs) is even 
more limited. In general, countryspecif ic skills, language 
barriers and cultural attachments prevent high labour mobility. 
And this again sets a further limit to real capital mobility 
because it often depends on specific skills of workers (see 
Unger 1990) . Though there has definitely been an increase in 
factor mobility, there are, nevertheless, constraints to its 
further development. There is a limit to convergence of economic 
facts and data. This means that in spite of the fact that policy 
needs and options have changed and will change in the future, 
national economic policy is far from becoming obsolete. In a 
world of nonconvergence the choice of economic policy variables 
is still a political option. 
Arguments for The Convergence of Economic Variables and Economic 
Policies under Increasing Internationalization: 
The co~strain~s of national economic variables and policies 
under 1ncreas1n~ int~rnationalization are the following (we 
argue for <:ount~ies with a fixed exchange rate regime and later 
for countries with the same currency): 
Int4:rest ra~e~ are determined abroad (in the case of perfect 
capital mobi~ity even not the slightest interest difference 
would be possible due to arbitrage except for differences in the 
excdh~nge rate expectations and perceptions whether countries are 
ere it.-orthy). 
If. in~ernational competitiveness on goods markets is to be 
~~7ntained, the terms of trade have to stay (at least) constant 
75 oeafns that a small country's price level (especially th~ 
prices or tradable goods) r t · · · deternined from O ra e of inflation is largely 
labour mobility ;~~cad. (I~dthe case of perfect real capital and 
countries). ces wou have to be exactly the same between 
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The overall balance of payments has to be in equilibrium in 
order to avoid foreign exchange reserve losses and exchange rate 
deteriorations, which would in turn affect the domestic price 
level and the terms of trade. 
These three constraints affect small and large countries 
differently. Large countries can influence the interest rate and 
the price level, while small countries are price takers and have 
to adjust their economy respectively (see e.g. Priewe 1990, who 
shows the possibilities for autonomous German economic politics 
even in the very sensitive field of i.nterest rate determination; 
for a more sceptical view see Scharpf 1987,p.302ff).) Since we 
don't want to address the question of the power game of who 
determines what in Europe, we concentrate on small open 
economies against the rest of the world. 
These constraints have an immediate influence on the 
possibilities of small countries' national economic policies: 
1.) If interest rates are determined abroad monetary policy 
cannot be practiced any longer. Any increase in the money supply 
which the central bank aimed at lowering interest rates in order 
to induce additional investment would result in an immediate 
outflow of capital until the money supply and the interest rates 
are the same as before. 
2.) Budget deficit spending also becomes more difficult if the 
financing of the deficit increases the interest rate, if it has 
inflationary effects or if it deteriorates the balance of 
payments (In Buiter' s (1985) terminology: if "old fashioned 
Keynesian" or "old fashioned neoclassical crowding out" takes 
place). This would mean that differences in budget deficits 
between countries should diminish. 
3.) If the domestic interest rate is determined abroad, 
functional distributionary policy also becomes ineffective. This 
is due to the fact that the interest rate on financial capital 
is linked to the rate of profit on real capital. 
Traditional economic policies like monetary policy, fiscal 
policy and distributionary policy should according to these 
arguments converge between countries. 
Arguments against convergence 
1. ) As mentioned in the very beginning, factors are not 
perfectly mobile. Economic reality always means frictions, 
imperfections, uncertainty, lack of information, lags of 
reaction etc. In this imperfect world traditional instruments 
still can perform and diverge. 
2.) Furthermore, small countries can take free rider positions 
as long as the "big" countries do not drastically react. In open 
macroeconomics the example most often cited for this is the 
"beggar my neighbor policy": if a small country devalues only 
once it can improve its international competition at the cost of 
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the other countries. A less quoted example of small countries' 
free rider possibilities is especially relevant for the planned 
EC monetary union. If, for example, countries with the same 
currency persue commonly a restrictive monetary policy, they 
also have to pursue a restrictive fiscal policy in order to 
maintain low inflation rates. A small country can now profit 
from the fact that inflation is low and that there cannot be any 
exchange rate effects by simply following an expansionary fiscal 
policy. This country would have no unemployment to the 
disadvantage of the big countries while profiting from their low 
rate of inflation. 
since an indebted country in a commom currency area cannot be 
"punished" through the balance of payment and the exchange rate 
deterioration seems to be the most important difference between 
the present European Monetary System and the planned common 
currency. The threat of free riding by small countries seems to 
lay behind the increased efforts in Europe to "converge by law" 
before the currency area is created. Nevertheless, as will be 
shown in the empirical part on the US, convergence is not a 
necessary condition for the functioning of a currency area. 
3 . ) Even in a frictionless world there are differences in 
preferences, culture and historical development. To give an 
example: the high "property taxes" in anglophone countries would 
appear revolutionary to Germans and Austrians, while their high 
income taxes would shock Americans. Differences in tax systems 
and social security systems will still remain significant since 
historically developed country-specific differences will 
prevail. 
II. Some Empirical Evidence on Convergence - The American states 
Whether differences among regions or nations persist, diminish 
or increase is an empirical matter. The United states are a good 
subject for analyzing this question, since they have more than 
hundred years of experience with a common currency - the dollar. 
If a common currency area needs or leads to convergence of 
macroeconomic data this should be reflected in US-data. 
The fifty Amer~can States differ substantially by historical and 
cultu~al experiences. They reach from Louisiana's french-spanish 
colonial background, the great gold rush in California of 1849 
the war against the federal government of the 11 southern state~ 
between 1861-65, to Wisconsin's scandinavian influence or 
Alaska's rugged climate (see Dye 1966). In this respect the 
States can be compared to European nations. 
(For differences between Europe and the us see later). 
Empirical studies on the convergence across states have recently 
been done by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991). They examine the 
~rowth and disp~rsion of personal income and Gross state Product 
in the States since 1880 and conclude that there is convergence 
but a very slow one. For US per capita personal income from 1880 
to 1988 the speed of convergence, B, is around 2 percent a year, 
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i.e. differences between rich and poor States get smaller by two 
percent a year. They conclude that there is no evidence that 
poor regions are getting systematically behind in the growth 
process. The study only concentrates on income data and has a 
very long term perspective. But for our question - whether 
macroeconomic policy variables adjust - a shorter time period 
and additional variables are needed. (The definite advantage of 
the Barro-Sala-I-Martin-study is, that the convergence indicator 
is consistently derived out of a growth model, while the 
indicators we are going to introduce are plausibilities or ad-
hoe assumptions of convergence). 
This diminishing of differences among the states (in history, 
economics, growth rates, ethnic and racial composition) has also 
been stressed by political scientists and has been labeled the 
"nationalization" of States. But many important differences 
between the states are n o t diminishing (see Dye 1991 for 
political differences). 
In fiscal aspects the 50 States can only partly be compared to 
the planned Euopean single market or currency union, since the 
Federal government deals with about 50% of the agendas, while a 
comparable European Central State (the EC-Commission) would be 
much weaker. Nevertheless it is worth to analyze the states in 
order to see potential possibilities for Europe. 
The 50 states do have some similarities: 
All States and communities provide significant facilities in 
education (most costly),law enforcement, crime prevention, 
welfare, health and hospitals, highways, housing, urban renewal 
water supply and transportation (Dye 1969). 
All state constitutions have articles on taxation and finance: 
1. ) they place severe restrictions upon the taxing power of 
state and local governments 
2.) they earmark certain state revenues for specific programs 
(gasoline tax for highway purpose ... ). Approximately half of all 
state revenues are earmarked! 
3.) they set limitations on debt (except in 5 states) 
Some constitutions prevent the state from contracting any debt, 
others set dollar limits (Dye 1969 p.22). 
Nevertheless, there are also considerable differences among 
states with respect to social and welfare issues: 
State expenditures include expenditures for unemployment 
compensation and state and local retirement systems. In the 
public assistance field (payments to the aged, blind, disabled, 
dependent children) the federal government pays only half of the 
costs. States and local governments take responsibility for the 
other half. The Social security Act induces states to enact 
unemployment compensation programs through the imposition of a 
payroll tax on all employers. states have considerable freedom 
to shape their own unemployment programs. (amount of benefits, 
eligibility, length of time that benefits can be drawn etc.). A 
further feature of the Social Security Act was public assistance 
provisions for the aged, the blind, the disabled and dependent 
children. Within broad outlines of the federal policy, states 
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~ · cons-;derable discretion in their welfare programs. Each 
re.a::1 s-:a-:e :ay choose to grant assistance . beyond the amounts 
suocor-:ed by the national government, or it may choose to have 
:1o· ··..-elfare prograti at all. Furthermore s~ates have their own 
st::,.ndards to deter:iine "need". General assistance programs (for 
pe::-sons who do not fall in one of. the four catego_ries blind, 
aged, disabled and dependent children) are entirely state 
financed and ad.ministered. These arrangements differ 
substantially f=oti state to state. Ptlblic health and sanitation 
policies are acong the oldest tasks of local government. State 
and local authorities provide hospitals and their quality and 
quantity varies ·.lidely (see oye 1966 p.420-425). Average monthly 
welfare paYtlents per family range between 560 Dollars in Alaska 
to 110 dollars in Alabama (Dye (1991) p.472). 
The cost striking differences in the tax system among states 
are: 
1.) D~fferences ~n retafl sales tax rates. They vary from 0%-9%. 
2.) Differences in excises, especially on alcoholic beverages 
cigarettes and motor fuel. cross border shopping is essential 
in the us. 
J.) Differences in corporate and personal income taxes (see 
Pelk::lans/Vanheukelen 1988). 
Table 1 gives an overview of States without sales and · 
taxes in 1989: incomes 
Table 1: States Without Sales and Incomes Taxes in 1989 
S.-r.tN,~ 
GmS4'nor 
Gr.:u ~tet-::a :'un 
in: Dye (1991) p,4 82 
-.... .. 
Slatu 'Nitrrour 
tnaiv,auaJ 
tncom9 iaxss 
Alasxa 
CJnnec::Cl.lt' 
P.onda 
~ 
NewHam~ 
Scutt10al<Ot3 
Stares Without 
coroorare 
tncom9 iaxss 
Nevada 
Texas 
Wasnington 
Wyoming 
• .. e .ax burden d; f'f 
- •• ers consequentl 
:.axes ~s a percentage of personal. y. In 1986, State and Local 
~a=~s~:re, 42% in wyocing and 71~n~ome vary between 14% in New 
.. ex. t-age). in Alaska (see Figure 1 on 
conclude, that though th . 
a::iong the Am . ere 1.s a slow tendency 
· erican States, significant 
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differences in economic policy still persist after hundred 
years. countries, regions and governance units within one 
currency area can differ not only by geographic, historical, 
demographic and political factors but also by constitutional, 
legal and economic factors (taxes, public expenditure, income, 
income distribution, resources}. 
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Figure J: State and local tax revenue 1986 
{as a percentage of personal income) 
i:,: 
I.Alas. 
2. Wyo. 
J. N.M. 
4. Monr. 
S. Utan 
6.N.Y. 
7. N.O. 
a. t..a. 
9. W.Va. 
10. Minn. 
11. Miss. 
12. Ore. 
13. Del. 
14. Wise. 
15. Vt-. 
16. s.o. 
17. Mien. 
18. Hawaii 
19: M•. 
20. R.l. 
21. Ky. 
22. Okla. 
2::1. Ala. 
24. Iowa 
25. Ariz. 
26. s.c. 
'O. Nao. 
28. Wasn. 
-0. ldano 
JO. NeY. 
JI.CaliF. 
J2. Cala. 
Jl. Ga. 
34. Chio 
JS. ?a. 
36.M. 
'!l. Mass. 
JS. rex. 
39. Kan. 
'°· r-,. 
41. Md. 
42. N.C. 
4l. Ind. 
u. Ill. 
45. N.J. 
46. Cam. 
47. Fla. 
48. Va • 
.£9. Mo. 
SO. N.H. 
,,'iio~-:,;;a--:Jt:a:---"°~-.;so~-60L_J70 
Dye (1991) p.485 
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III. Differences between the u.s. and th 
e European Co1:1munity 
~n this study we a~e trying to i~entify some features of 
internal market, in order to find out whether the the US 
lessons to be drawn for the European inte rat. re are soi:e 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that one ~houlidonb process. 
· th h · b f t . e careful 
wil't~ucl comp~r~so~, lec~us~.~ ?e differences in historical 
polli ica.' tshocit~ ogica .,dinsdi ution~l and economic context a~ 
we as in e ime perio un er consideration. It is crucial to 
take these ~actors into accou~t when trying to single out soce 
features which are to be used in a comparative study on th us 
and Europe. e • • 
To begin with, the two areas are in different phases of 
integration. While the US internal market has been established 
for ~ite some "t:ime now, the EC Common n:iarket is still in 
creation. That difference has some essential impacts on the 
overall economic performance - used as an integration indicator 
in the present study - as well as for the dynamics of future 
development. As we learn from the literature on the economic 
impacts of European integration, the abolishment of barriers to 
an internal market has already quite considerable (macro- and 
micro-) economic effects. It is to be expected that these 
effects are - at least partly - due to the "newness" of the 
liberalisations as well as to the considerable positive 
psychological expectations. These effects are special to the 
European case. On the other hand the recent legal, political and 
administrative measures taken to implement the Common Market are 
only partly or not yet long enough in effect, to guide economic 
actions and performance. Shortly, the ongoing process of the 
creation of the European Common Market produces features 
specific to the creation process and therefore not relevant in 
the U.S. case. 
There are also important non-economic factors which call for 
caution in comparison, such as differences in political 
tradition, institutional setting, legal framework, and factors 
associated with societal phenomena as well as demography and 
geography. 
The political setting in the u. s. is more homogeneous than in 
Europe. Hence, given comparable legal f~ameworks there are to 
remain differences in factual integration, as long as so::ie 
"Spielraum" (range respectively. choi?e of manoeuvre) fC?r 
national policies prevails And in spite of the quite rapid 
• 1 · h ice will legal harmonization process, such room fa~ po ic~ c 0 
not be eliminated entirely. studies analyzing the impact of t~e 
composition of the government in power on mac~oe~~~o:~~ 
performance suggest that in the U.S. there is no signi ic 
relationship· "relationships between the economic developmentf 
. • d upon the influence o and policy outcomes do not depen 6. 246 ) For Democratic or Republican party success ". (Dye 1:~i~h su.ggest 
Europe however there are many research find ings • 12 
relationships. Rothschild (1986) showed in a s~udy ~~al~f~~~nd 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, German~ e;~:..,ay Sweden: 
France, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlan s1 ' 
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tha t there are some correlations between the s·_.i~::erland) wth 1 t d 
. . f government and real gro , unemp oymen an 
: 0 ::.pos~tionHo found that in periods of high growth and full 
inflation. e . • B t f th t · t there are no maJ or influences• u rom e seven ies 
e:::.ploy:en 'left, and 'left-coalition' governed countries 
on·-ards, · f h · h wth d perfor:ied consistently better in terms o ig er gro an 
lo1o·er unemployment• 
These different outcomes for t?e U. st.. andN tE1;1rople can 1?e 
interpreted in terms of degree of ~ntegrat iond. a ionfaf ect<?nom7c 
policies seem to have been more differen ~n more e ec ive in 
~uropean countries. Nevertheless, other differences could also 
;xplain the findings. European po~itical. systems have parti7s 
which differ considerably in their choice of macro-economic 
goals and of instruments for attaining them. Though there has 
been a tendency of the parties to move to the center of the 
political spectrum important dif_ferences re~ain. ~h~s le~ds to 
our conclusion that room for national economic policies will be 
used more extensively within the European economic area. 
Another aspect which has to be taken into consideration in 
comparing the U. s. with the European internal market is the 
degree of factor mobility, especially the labour mobility. 
Labour mobility is considerably higher in the U.S. than in 
Europe, because of various cultural and societal aspects rooted 
in different historical experiences. Other factors are 
institutional and legal restrictions which either still exist or 
have been removed only recently. Even the abolishment of all 
legal and institutional barriers to labour movement would show 
significant effects only after some time of adjustment and 
reorientation. Even then the degree of labour movement is 
expected to be more limited in Europe because of persisting 
cultural differences such as the language problem. 
IV. The legal foundations of the process of integration in 
Europe 
~ disti~cti ye f eatu7e. of -t;he o_ngoing integration process in 
t.urope i;3 i ~s mul tidi1;1ez:isionality. The economic integration 
process is. tied to political, legal and social rapprochement. 
Any analysis has to take into account these different dimensions 
~~d th:ir mutual influence. In this paper we will single out two 
. 
1:iens1ons: In talking about economic integration it is of 1
=Portance to consider the legal basis of the 
1
integration process i 1 d · · Cc::=unit nc u ing its development over ti~e. In th7 European 
i Y the legal process performs a maJ or role in guiding econo:i c dynamics and vice-versa. 
The general perspe t. th 
·..-ere laid down . c ives on e European integration process 
integration T in the early documents on European post-war 
-"li'ti'c 1 . · he Schuman-Plan for example a statement of 
~.., a intent cancer in E · ' Gc-..,ern-ent prop d n g uropean integration by the French 
s~eel-indu~try ~se t~ merger 0 ~ the G:rman and French coal- and 
5 e starting point of an ever closer 
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cooperation. It is interesting to go back to those first 
documents of the European post-war integration because they 
clearly draw the picture of the process which has been going on 
since then. The main steps in the first phase of the 
establishment of the European Community are well known, the 
Treaty of the European Community for Coal and Steel of 1951 and 
the Treaties of Rome, of the European Atomic Agency and of the 
European Economic Community of 1957. Without going too much in 
detail it is interesting to follow the legal steps since then. 
we will emphasize the "formal integration" in terms of the 
transfer of economic policy competences from national to 
supranational levels of authority. 
originally the EEC was mainly concerned with establishing a 
customs union. The main competence of the EEC concerned the 
shaping of common trade policy (Article 113 EEC-Treaty). At this 
stage, the member countries were not prepared to give up their 
competences in monetary policy, fiscal policy or other economic 
policies. The Treaty remained fairly general about further 
reaching common economic policies. The Treaty generally stated 
business-cycle policies as a matter of common interest (Art. 103 
EEC-Treaty) and defined high level of employment, price 
stability and balance of payments equilibrium as common goals 
for national economic policies (Art. 104). 
After having achieved the customs union in the sixties the EEC 
focused more on economic and monetary union. The Werner Report, 
a plan which promoted free movement of capital, fixed exchange 
rates and coordination of monetary policies, was adopted by the 
EC-council in 1971. The Werner Report further proposed the 
harmonization of economic policies, mainly in the field of 
fiscal policy. Because of events in the world economy, the 
implementation of the proposed steps towards economic and 
monetary union was delayed. Nevertheless some progress was made 
by fixing the exchange rate margins, the "snake in the tunnel". 
In the seventies the integration process stagnated. One further 
significant step was the decision of the EC-Council to establish 
the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 with the European 
currency Unit (ECU) as a central element. The main declared 
policy goal was to secure internal and external stability. 
Though in the first phase the EMS did not prevent divergence in 
economic policies, it constituted an important corner stone in 
setting favorable conditions for further European economic and 
monetary integration (Ungerer 1990:330ff; Abrams et al 
1990:39f). 
The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 was a further legal 
instrument towards closer integration. Though many of the 
elements were alre~dy mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, the major 
contribution was the legal fixing of the goal date of 1992 for 
the completion of the internal market (Art. Sa EEC-Treaty). The 
establishment of the common market with free factor mobility 
(the four "freedoms") constitutes a central element in shaping 
and forwarding economic union. The extended possibility of 
qualified majority voting instead of unanimous voting for EC-
council decisions concerning measures to implement the internal 
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::iarket (Art. 100a) constitutes a major step forward. Further 
• · of the SEA are designed to secure the convergence of 
orov1s1ons . 
econo::iic and currency ~olicies (Art. 130a ff)-, promotion of 
research and technological develop~en~h (~r\· 13t°,f ff) and 
others. The signific~nce of the EEA 1n e in egra ion process 
· great because it paved the way towards a reenforced 
t~tegration momentum which. fo~lowE:d the peri?d of 
"Euroscleroses" of the beginning eighties, the dynamics are 
prevalant up to the present. 
While the SEA was designed to promote the completion of the 
internal market, the Del ors Report, adopted by the European 
council in June 1989, intended to stimulate the process of the 
establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union. The Delors 
Report core proposals were the establishment of the EMU in three 
stages, with the creation of a single currency and the 
establishment of a European system of Central Banks. Monetary 
union should be secured through total and irreversible 
convertibility of currencies, completely free movement of 
capital, fully integrated financial markets and fixed exchange 
rates. The first stage, which should lead towards greater 
convergence of the economic performance through the strenghening 
of economic and monetary policy coordination within the existing 
institutional framework, started on July 1, 1990. The Delors 
Report contained a series of concrete measures to promote the 
integration of economic policies including binding rules for 
budgetary policies. 
After more than two decades of discussion about the shape of the 
Economic and Monetary Union and various advances in this 
direction, the signing of the Treaty on European Union on 
February 7, 1992 constitutes a major achievement in favor of the 
European integration. 
Besides the provisions on the Economic and Monetary Union the 
Treaty on European Union contains amendments to the Treati~s of 
Ror:ie. and Paris wh~ch mainly enlarge EC competences 
( env 1r~nme1; ta 1 protec~1on, consumer policies, energy etc) • The 
harmonization of fore1gn and security policies with the option 
to ~e~elop a_commo1; defense policy are the main elements of the 
Pol1t1cal Union wh1c~ is int_ended to come gradually into being. 
The Treaty of_Maastr1~ht points out the multidimensionality of 
the European integration process. Economic integration efforts 
;r~ .b~t one. aspect ~f the development towards an European Union. 
~ 0 1t 1cal. integra_tion constitutes a special element of the 
-uropean integration process which is qu · t d · ti' t f th 
ongoing ld · d , i e is nc rom e 
wor -wi e internationalization. 
The provisions of the E • 
a::bitious in terns ~onomic and Monetary Union are very 
first two stages otfh forEcCing the _process of convergence. In the 
.. . e -countries are 11 d t · k 
... o.ards convergence of inf . . ea e upon o wor 
rate stability and sust . 1~~ion. and interest rates, exchange 
beginning of ~tage two a~a e fiscal deficits and debt. At the 
Institute (EMI) shall ( ~nuary 1, ~994) a European Monetary 
surveillance of progress e eSt ablished to intensify the 
towards convergence of economic 
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performance. Given the severe criteria set as "e t 
the monetary union, the "Spielraum" (e~onomic ol~ ranee_ fee" to 
the EC-member states become more restricted T~e s~Y.c~oic~s) ?f 
for inflation, exchange rates, government•~ deficf;c crite~ia 
restrictive policy margins for the national states sT~reTquite 
on European Union states the following criteria as·m e reaty 
of the achievement of a high degree of sustainable ceasurement 
(article 109j and the corresponding protocol on the c~~~ergence 
criteria) which shall guide.the Community in the decisione!~:~~e 
on. the passage to the third stage of economic and monet g 
union: ary 
* a high degree of price stability, specified . as a price 
performance where the average rate of inflation (measured by 
means of the consumer price index) of the member has not to 
exceed the rates of the three best performing states by more 
than 1.5 percentage points. 
* the sustainability of the government financial position 
avoidance of excessive government deficits which is specified a; 
a maximum 3% ratio of the government deficit to gross domestic 
product at market prices and a maximum of 60% ratio of 
government debt to gross domestic product at market prices (Art. 
104c(2) and Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure). 
* observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS for the last two years 
without devaluating against the currency of any other Member 
State 
* an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not 
exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of the three best 
performing members. 
States that do not fulfill the necessary conditions for adopting 
a single currency may have a derogation by decision of the 
European Council. The member states with a derogation are not 
represented in the decision-making bodies of the European 
Central Bank. 
The fact that the treaty also provides for sanctions on members 
that do not satsfy the convergence criteria, gives the EC 
significant authority in guiding respectively influencing 
national economic policies. Excessive deficits (by the above 
mentioned definition and overall assessment of the EuroI?ean 
council) can be sanctioned with measures of varying severity. 
starting with mere policy recommendations to the ~tate . in 
question, the treaty provides sanctions such as reconsideration 
of loans to the member by the European Investment Bank, . t~e 
requirement of a non-interest-bearing d~p~sit until.the deficit 
has been corrected, and the imposition of fines of an 
appropriate size (Art. 104c). 
With the beginning of stage three (at the late5t 0 ~ J~~~~~tiy 
1999), the integration process definitely_ enters a signi and the 
higher level. With the adoption of a single c~r~en~; (ESCB) 
establishment of a European System of _centra a;horit ave; 
independent of government directives, taking ov;r aunomic iolicy 
monetary and exchange rate policy, some centra eco 
L 
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. t di·verted from the national state's influence. In instrumen s are · h · t · f 
co::rnination with the Community's ':om~etencefs ~nd_ar"f!ldonilza tiotn ~ 
. • t ation and the restrictions o in ivi ua s a e s 
1.1:d1.re1ct /~ies to strict discipline, the possibilities for f is~a 1P
0 
c
1
onomic policies are severely limited - at least 
nati.ona e 
legally. 
one could argue that the implementation of theklegal _Provisions 
::ii ht not be so strict. But even then, t~e ey point of the 
~ent is that the development over time clearly shows a 
;~ocess of ever increasing "Vergemeinschaft~n~" (transfer of 
co0 petences to the EC) in terms of legal provisions. 
This glimpse on the legal frame of the EC-integration reveals 
important features of the process. Although periods of 
stagnation and divergence among member states occured, although 
discussions on the design of the framework went on for years, 
even for decades, nevertheless the legal outcomes provided for 
ever more integration. This leads to the suggestion that the 
integration shows a clear trend which is leading towards the 
creation of an "ever closer union". This is true for "normal" 
conditions, only extreme political or economic disturbances 
(like war, nationality disputes, deep depression etc.) could 
perhaps still disturb or even destroy the process. But besides 
that the dynamics are prevailing. This is in line with the 
functionalist respectively the neo-functionalist theory which 
suggests that integration is a gradual process which starts from 
some more or less "technical" area of cooperation and extends 
into other policy areas. Step by step more and more policies are 
deferred from national to supranational authorities. The 
founders of the EC seemed to have had this in mind as documented 
in the preamble of the founding treaties. This view of the 
integration process is not only true for the EC but also for its 
relation to the countries of the European Free Trade Area. The 
latter signed a free trade agreement with the EC in 1972. Since 
then, cooperation and integration have increased steadily. The 
Treaty on the establishment of the European Economic Space 
~hich has recently been concluded between the EC and the EFTA: 
countries, constitutes the peak so far. 
~he cruc_ial question in the light of this analysis of the 
int7g7ati.on process addresses the Spielraum for individual 
d7c1s1.ons '?f the pa_rticipating countries. Of course there are 
different intersections where to decide about the shape of the 
fut~re process and about the degree of commitment. But - once 
decided - how much room is left and is there any room left for 
re~urn? The Europ~an int~g;ation process seems to deny the last 
~
01
~~- O~ce certa~n policies are in the competence of the EC-
... ns ... 1tut1ons, nat1ona~ po~icies are subordinated. Trying to 
neglect European law 1s II illegal II and l 'k t 1 f ; .. t · - un i e mos ru es o 
... n ... erna 1onal law - European law · 
constitute an i'.,.,port t f ls enforcable. These facts ~ an eature of th · t · d · t,1lat re?:1ains is the t. e in egration ynamics. 
Spielraut:1 is. This hasqu:; ion of how _spacious the ~eft-over 
according to the very p 1 . b_e a~swered 1n a differentiated way 0 icies 1n question. What we are trying 
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to single out in the present work is the question of how far 
macroeconomic policies are still subject to the shaping of 
national policies. We are coming back to this point later. At 
this moment the question of the Spielraum is to analyze in terms 
of general features, meaning in terms of the general dynamics of 
the integration process. Taking into account the analysis laid 
out above it could be suggested that, whatever the "Spielraum" 
presently is, the room for national macroeconomic policies is 
expected to diminish. This seems to be a trivial result but it 
has to be borne in mind when interpreting the performance of the 
past decades. 
v. Macro-economic performance in the European context 
In this section we will present some data on the macro-
performance indicators in EC- and EFTA-countries. Furthermore we 
will try to explain differences by reference to some EC-/EFTA-
countries' differences. The next section will consider 
convergence/divergence indicators in the OECD, the EC, the EFTA 
and between them. 
Within the internationalization framework in Western Europe, 
there are two integration territories to be distinguished, the 
European Community and the European Free Trade Area (consisting 
of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland). The EC and the EFTA differ in many respects. Main 
differences lie in the definition of the goal of integration. ~ 
While the EC aims at the creation of a European Union, the EFTA / 
is a more "pragmatic" organization, designed to foster trade and (__ 
to prevent economic retardation in relation to the EC. The 
intensity and degree of realized integration differ hence 
considerably. Further distinctions to be taken into account are 
related to size (in terms of economic as well as geogaphic and 
demographic criteria) and to openness of the economy. 
The EC member states and EFTA members differ considerably in 
terms of the macro performance indicators unemployment, 
inflation and growth rates over the past decades. During the 
period 1960 - 1972, the first post war integration phase, the 
EC-countries showed a significantly better performance in terms 
of growth, 4. 9%, as against 3, 5% for the EFTA (average real 
GDP). This seems to support the hypothesis that the larger and 
more intense integration area (EC, Customs Union) produces 
better growth rates than the smaller and more loosely tied EFTA. 
This is not any more true for the subsequent integration phase 
1973 - 1987. During this period, the EFTA-countries showey 
significantly better results, especially in unemployment and 
growth rates. Breuss (1990) developed an indicator for measurin ,
1
. 
macro-economic performance (MAG4) containing the dimensions real 
GDP-growth, balance of payments as a percentage of GDP, rate of\ 
unemployment and inflation rate. The first two dimensions 1 .. 
influence this indicator positively, the rates of unemployment\ 
and inflation negatively. Though many objections can be made to · 
an indicator of this kind (overaggregation etc), it can be 
useful to give an overall picture. Table 2) shows the results 
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. The EC clearly showed 
!or t..l-\e per~od d!6¾_;!~7 ·period (1961/1972), while 
oer!or::iancelea1.dn in the second period ( 1973/1987) • 
~akes t.1-ie 
a better 
the EFTA 
2·. Macro-economic performance of EFTA and EC (MAG 4*) Table 
s 
. ·· 
................... -.......... . 
,.·· 
... 
-18 • ••• • I ._. .i 
! 
-EG 6 
-1s 
--EG 1Z 
-28 
·•• EFTA 6 
·- EFTA 9 
-zs 
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 197S 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 
in: Breuss (1990) p.67 
•> The 1111Cro-tcMOn1ic performance lrdfcator MAG4 represents the aggregation of real GDP-growth rate, 
balarce of payments as a percentage of GDP, ~loyment rate and inflation rate. 
For assessing the influence of integration, it is of interest to 
search for possible causes of performance differences and to 
examine whether there is a link to specific characteristics of 
the different integration te~ritories EC and EFTA. 
Possible explanations for differences in economic performance 
between EC and EFTA 
In analyzing the economic performance in the seventies we have 
to_take into account the exogenous shocks, especially the oil-
price shocks. Thus the EFTA-countries seem to have been able to 
~eact core flexibly to these disturbances.· While the EC has 
l.~tegrated conmen economic policies to some extend, the EFTA is 
a i::ore technical integration area in terms of mutual trade 
?r0 7°tion. Further economic integration does not take place. It 
is_i.opo~ant to note that the individual EFTA-countries persued 
qu~te different policies to cope with the economic challenge. 
'i'l"!'u;e. the Scandinavian countries used active exchange rate 
;ol1c1es, Austria pursued a hard-currency policy in combination 
~\ 
\
I[) , 
. ' 
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with expansionary fiscal-policy and some flexibility in real 
wages, which is sustained by the corporatist structures. This 
could explain handling of the initial effects of the oil crises 
but it does not constitute a basis for explaining further 
economic development (especially the persistence of 
unemployment). 
Though the EFTA-countries should not be viewed as a homogenious 
group they have some common features. An important one is the 
determination of their dominating goals of economic policy. EFTA 
countries traditionally put high value on the policy goal of 
high employment (with Switzerland as an exception which has 
emphased primarily price stability). Though the countries have 
followed quite different strategies in pursuing the goal of 
full-employment, their policies have proved quite successful 
until the beginning of the nineties. 
But different economic policies are only part of the 
explanation. Knobl (1990), for instance, indicates in a 
comparative study of a sample of fairly comparable economies, 
Austria and Sweden as EFTA-countries, and Denmark and the 
Netherlands as EC-member countries, that neither fiscal nor 
monetary policy show consistent results, and that the results do 
not clearly comply with financial deregulation and exchange rate 
policy as well. 
The result that macro-economic policies explain the differences 
in economic performance only partly, suggests that structural 
and institutional differences must be another element of 
explanation. Flexibility on the or market, measured as real wage 
flexibility seems to be significantly higher in the countries 
that show lower unemployment rates. Corporatism, an important 
feature of most EFTA-countries, provides for favorable framing 
conditions for economic policy. The typical structure of EFTA-
countries, small open economies, accounts for some room in 
taking a free-rider position. EFTA-countries seem successful in 
taking advantage of their specific structures in implementing a 
flexible policy-mix. (Unger 1990) In considering the future 
possibilities of small European countries• performance outside 
the EC, many economists suggest that there is not much room left 
for continuing the successful road of the past. Whether this is 
true or not cannot be answered, even less if we take into 
account that the "story" of the missing options for national 
economic policies in the internationalization framework is much 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In summarizing the findings at this point we can conclude that 
the differences respectively the divergence in economic 
performance between EC and EFTA countries is rooted in the 
characteristics of the EFTA-economies (SMOPECS) compared to the 
EC, in more flexibility in economic policies in the EFTA-
countries, in differing policy goals, and in different internal 
political structures (corporatism) (see also Klatzer/Marterbauer 
1991 p.4ff). Here we find out, that the "Spielraum" for economic 
policies is a crucial point in the determination of economic 
performance. 
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ot Macroeconomic variables in the OECD VI. Is there convergence 
and in EUROPE?*) 
. • 1 material (calculations, tables and graphs) which 
*)T~e e:ipir~c!nd to which we refer in this part has been done by 
~~rj~~:bj~rdjevic (1992), as a part of her diploma work at our 
depart:ient • 
In order to find out whet~er there is a tendency towards 
rgence in the OECD and in Europe (EC and/or EFTA) conve . . . 
~e selected three variables for comparison. 
The discount rate as an ind_icator fo~ the options. of monetary 
policy. If capital mobility is indefin:tely high, discount rates 
should completely converge under fixed exchange rates and 
conetary policy would be ineffective. 
The rate of inflation as an indicator for the mobility of goods 
(tradables) and for the options of monetary and or fiscal 
policy. If the rate of inflation converges, monetary policy 
becoces ineffective and fiscal policy's choice on the short run 
Phillips-curve between different levels of unemployment and 
inflation is reduced. 
The unemployment rate as an indicator for the mobility of our 
and for the options of fiscal policy. If unemployment rates 
converge the options for fiscal policy are diminished. 
Measures ot convergence 
E:::pirical results undoubtedly depend on the method used. We 
distinguish two sets of measures of convergence. The one used by 
the EC measures convergence as a decline of absolute deviations 
frot:1 the mean of a variable. If, e.g. inflation rate 
differentials between countries decline, the EC would conclude 
that countries converge. We, on the other hand, argue that 
inf~ation rate differentials may decline only because the level 
of 1nf~ation declines (If inflation is 20% a 10% differential is 
::ore likely to occur than if inflation is only 2%). An adequate 
::~a sure of convergence should be independent of the trend. We, 
~::erefore, t_ake. the percentage difference from the mean, the 
.. --~ndard deviation and variation coefficient (standard deviation 
~~·~ugh ~ean) ~s a measure of convergence (If the average rate 
~O\ nflation is 20% a 10% point differential shows the same 
2\)~eviation than a 1% point differential if inflation is only 
The follo~ing Figu 2 • of conver ence O re of ~e EMS optical.ly reflects the EC-view bdicate fhat thef inflation r<;ltes While our measure would 
' ... ~ .. eased (se F. percentage differences from the mean have 
.......... e 1gure 4). 
Figure 
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2: Rates of Inflation for Individual Countries 
(Consumer Price Indices} 
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VI .1. IS TRERE ANY CONVERGENCE IN TllE OECD'? *) 
*} OECD without New Zealand and Australia 
!290 
Discount Rates surprisingly show no convergence between 1972 
and 1990 (see Appendix I for data) • Neither the standard 
deviation of the discount rates from the mean (EC-view) nor the 
standard deviation of the percentage difference from the mean 
(our view) show a systematic decline (see Appendix I Table la 
and lb) • Optically the plot of the percentage deviations of the 
discount rates of various OECD countries from the OECD mean from 
1972 to 1990 gives the same insight (the absolute deviation 
treats plus and minus deviations the same) see Figure 3. It 
plots all OECD countries percentage deviations from the OECD 
\ 
;· { 
,·'f . 
. , .. 
: .,_, 
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:e~~ !or t~e years 1972-1990. 
. t Rates in the OECD 19?2- 1990 
: :. :;·..!:-e ) : D!.Sc~u~ions from the mean (absolute values) 
~ •--e ..... ~ge cev1a t 11'a) 
,·e • - ·• - . ,1 •.; zeal and and Aus ra :~:~ (~!.~hout, e 
j 
I' 
.I 
·I 
·; 
·, 
in the 
Inflation Rates also show no convergence (see Appendix I Table 
2 ~r.d Appendix I Figure 1) and the following Figure 4. 
Figure~: Inflation Rates in the OECD 1972-1993 
P~:-ccntage Deviations from the OECD-mean (absolute values) 
-
-
' 
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unemployment rates also show no systematic convergence tendency 
(see Appendix I Table 3 and Appendix I Figure 3) and Figure 6. 
Figure 5: Unemployment Rates in the OECD 1972-1993 
Percentage Deviations of the OECD-mean (absolute values) 
For the OECD-Europe plus us and Japan we can, therefore, 
conclude, that neither the EC-view of convergence nor our view 
of convergence is supported by the data. There seem to be too 
big differences among countries, too many shocks and barriers 
that prevent discount rates, inflation rates and unemployment 
rates from convergence. This has certainly also to do with the 
fact that the OECD-area is so big that factor mobility is 
limited by distance. In the following we, therefore, concentrate 
on the EC and on the EFTA countries in order to analyze 
convergence in a framework where we would a priori expect 
convergence to be more likely. 
VI.2. IS THERE ANY CONVERGENCE IN THE EFTA AND EC-COUNTRIES? 
The results of convergence/divergence in the EFTA-6 and EC-12 
countries can be summarized in the following table. The country 
in the first column is the one that converges/diverges towards 
the country in the second column (e.g. EFTA-EFTA means 
convergence of the EFTA countries towards the EFTA mean, EFTA-EC 
means convergence of EFTA countries towards EC countries etc. 
"EFTA*" means without Iceland, which - due to its hyperinflation 
rates - could bias the results. The last three columns show the 
percentages by which the percentage deviations from the mean 
have increased or decreased annually. A positive sign means 
divergence (increase of differences) and a negative sign means 
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::,::er~e~ce. ror exa::iple the first line on EFTA-EFTA-inflation 
:-~~es reads the foll?wing: between 1973 and 1~93 the percentage 
-.!e·: ia~ion of inflation rates of EFTA countries from the EFTA 
::e~~ have inc:-eased by 0.1% annualy on ayerage. There has hence 
tee~ a very slight divergence of inflat~on ra~es. Between 1973 
a~-.! 1984 there has been divergence of inflation rates of 4.8% 
~er yea:-, 'Jhil~ in ~he last period 1985 to 1?93 percentage 
de·:iations of inflation rates have converged with a speed of 
6.:t per year. 
7lble J: Sutu::1ary of results concerning divergence - convergence 
; -;~e detail led results and calculations are in Appendix II which 
1,1ill be distributed on request): 
EFTA COUNTRIES 
Rates of Inflation 
1972 - 1993 1972-1984 1985 -1993 
E!~ · E!ta 0.1 4.8 -6.1 
E!!i•· Eftt• -0.8 -0.4 -1,3 
E!!l • EG 1.0 3,1 -1.9 
E!:i• • EG -0.1 -0,3 0,2 
E:!1 · OECD 0.6 4,9 -5,0 
E!'!.l• • OECD I 1.3 I.I 1.5 
Rates of Unemployment 
I 1972 - 1993 1972- 1984 
E!~ · E!'!:I I -0.4 
1985 -1993 
!:~1!l.•· Ef!i• I 
·1,4 0,9 
-0.3 
::::.a · EG I 
-0.2 
·1,4 1,2 
::!'!.l• · EG I 
-0.7 
1,4 
-2.3 
:::!1 · CEO I 
-0.7 
0.2 
-1,9 
E!'!.l• · OEC:) I 
-0.2 
0,1 
-1.3 
1,6 
-2.6 
Discount Rates 
I 19i2 • 1990 1972-1984 E:!1 • Ef'::l I 1.0 
1985 -1990 
Ef!l•. E!'::l• I 0.1 
1,9 
--0,7 
E!'::l • EG I 
1,7 
-3,1 
Ef':.I• • EG 
2.3 1,5 
I 0.1 4.6 
E!~ · OEC:) I 0.9 
1,3 
-2.3 
£!-:a• .. CEO I 0.1 
1,6 
-0.3 
1.5 
-2.9 
""' -... 
Rates of Inflation 
i 
' t_- ~ - 1972-1993 I 
:: ~• a :,1:j 1972-1984 
I E: · '.:EO 
i 1.04 I 1985 -1993 
' 
3.71 
-0.2 I -2.5 3.1 
-4.6 
(Table 3 continued) 
Rates of Unem0lovment 
I 1972 • 1993 
EG-EG I -0.8 
EG-OECD I 0.38 
Discount Rates 
1972 • 1990 
EG· EG 0.27 
EG- OECD 0,52 
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I 
I 
I 
1972 • 1984 I 1985 • 1993 
-1.5 I 0.1 
0.07 I 0.78 
1972 • 1984 1985 - 1990 
1,53 
-2.3 
1.36 
-1.0 
In the last period since 1985 inflation rates converged between 
EFTA-countries (-6.1% per year, -1.3% without Iceland) and 
converged towards the EC-8 (-1.9%). If we leave out the 
reduction of Iceland's hyperinflation since 1990, results 
without Iceland show that even a slight divergence from the EC 
took place (0.2% per year). In the period before, from 1973 to 
1984, inflation rates have diverged between EFTA countries 
( 4, 8%) and from the EC (3 .1%). EFTA countries' inflation rates 
without Iceland seem to be quite independent from the EC. This 
is surprising, since the EC is the main trading partner of EFTA-
countries. But altogether we can see a tendency of convergence 
of inflation rates between EFTA countries and no significant 
divergence of EFTA countries without Iceland from the EC. 
Unemployment rates on the other hand diverged since 1985 between 
EFTA countries and converged between EFTA and EC (and also 
between EFTA and OECD). For the period before (1973-84) we had 
the opposite effect: unemployment rates converged between EFTA 
countries and di verged from the EC. This can be due to the. f ~ct 
~hat EFTA countries pursued quite different emp;o~ent p~licies 
in the 1970s, in particular full employment policies, while the 
EC did not. Since 1985, EFTA countries seem to pursue splitted 
strategies: Austria, Norway and Finland follow the EC trend and 
have increasing unemployment rates while Iceland, Sweden and 
Switzerland still maintain very low unemployment rates (see 
Appendix I for unemployment dat~). 
Discount rates converged within EFTA countries since ~98S and 
also converged clearly towards the EC and OECD_if we disregard 
Iceland's high discount rate divergence. This supports ~he 
general view that high capital mobility reduces the marg;ns 
within which monetary policy can vary. The ye~rs before (73 -a~), 
nevertheless, show a general divergence of discount rates. 
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ror the EC-12, inflation rates converge towards the EFTA 
(without Iceland), the OECD and within EC countries. 
unemployment rates converge in the period of 73-84 but not since 
then. Discount rates converge since 1985. 
Altogether we can conclude that there is no systematic result 
whatsoever concerning the convergence of macroeconomic variables 
from 1973 till the present. Discount rates seem most likely to 
converge if we exclude some "exotic" high inflation countries 
like Iceland, Greece and Portugal. But, nevertheless, 
differences among countries are still high (the discount rate in 
France being 9.5%, in Germany 6.0% and in the UK 14%) Monetary 
policy seems to become limited by international trends of 
mobile capital. Inflation rates also have a tendency to 
converge, though there are islands of higher and lower inflation 
areas within Europe (the South and the North among others) that 
seem to persist. Unemployment rates seem to be the less 
predictable regarding convergence: Within EFTA countries one can 
see that unemployment rates can diverge and be manipulated with 
substantial differences. Within the EC there seems to be 
"stagnation" in convergence since 1985. 
our results indicate that if convergence takes place it is a 
very slow process not only in growth data as suggested by 
Sachs/Sala-I-Martin ( 1991) but also in other macroeconomic 
variables like inflation rates and unemployment rates. 
Especially the latter can be manipulated to a large extent. The 
fact, that short term Phillips-curves for most countries show 
rather an erratic point-scatter than a functional form ( see 
Figure 7) except for Japan and Austria (if we allow for shifts 
of the curve in our time period) indicates that even if 
inflation rates have to converge more and more due to 
internationalization, the level of unemployment rates still 
indicates that there is room for country-specific options. 
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Figure 6: Phillips-Curves from 1972-1990 
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Figure 6: Phillips-curves from.1972-1990 (continued) 
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Fiscal Policy therefore will have a decisive role in er t· 
country-specific differences of welfare levels and unemplo~ l~g 
This result fits _with our experiences with the American sta~~s: 
It also agrees wi~h rec~n:t re~earch d~ne by Eichengreen c1991) 
who suggests an intensification of fiscal policy in order t 
reduce regional unemployment in the European currency Union° 
Also Persson and Tabellini (1990), who argue from a politicai 
asp7c~ support our _arguments. They argue that "neglecting the political repercussions can lead one to overestimate the effects 
of Eu7opean in;tegration on do~estic policy formation ... 11 According to their model, voters will vote for a tax policy that 
insulates them from strategic considerations of international 
high capital mobility. Furthermore they show that European 
integration is likely to result in reallocation of resources 
within each country and in changes in relative incomes across 
sectors. Political and economic repercussions of integration 
work in opposite directions and sometimes the political 
repercussions dominate. 
Even if Europe succeeds in forcing convergence of important 
macroeconomic indicators by law, doubts still remain whether 
this will be a stable commitment, because: 
- there is no economic necessity to adjust economic data as long 
as factor immobilities persist. And as we have learned from the 
US, this is the rule and not the exception. 
- there is no economic necessity to adjust economic data as long 
as big countries play an umbrella function for smaller countries 
allowing them to assume free rider positions. 
- there is no easy way of forcing souvereign countries in a 
currency union not to play a free rider role. There can be the 
threat of exclusion from the currency club. But the 
possibilities of sanctioning a souvereign country by court-law 
if the country has decided to play free rider seem very limited. 
Even within the EC where such sanctions are fixed by treaty 
(Treaty on European Union) it is not yet foreseeable how these 
sanctions can be effectuated. 
- The currency union will, therefore, either leave margins for 
free riders' economic policy or will be an unstable agreement as 
Casella' s ( 19 91) results of a possible breakdown of the currency 
club suggest. 
The convergence arguments cannot be supported by the data until 
now if we allow for stricter measures of convergence than the EC 
does. But even with the EC definition of convergence ~s 
percentage point deviations· from the mean we have a sys~ematic 
decline of standard deviations since 1985 only_for EC-~iscount 
rates and EFTA-inflation rates. All other variables disc~s~ed 
above show no systematic and at best only a slightly declining 
trend. 
There is, therefore, room enough to design national specific 
28 
economic policies, especially in the fiscal policy and in the 
social policy area. Convergence is neither a precondition nor a 
result for economies exposed to internationalization. Whether it 
desirable is a value judgement that we leave up to the reader. 
To avoid it is a feasible option. 
Even with increased internationalization what Kurt Rothschild 
wrote still holds: Economic policy is first and foremost 
politics. There are no single solutions and no Sachzwaenge 
(technical determinism) but there is always a political choice 
(Rothschild 1990). 
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Appendix I: 
App.I/Table la: Discout Rates in OECD countries 
(without Australia and New Zealand) 
1m 1973 1974 1975 1976 Im 197! 1979 19!0 1981 19!2 1913 193-4 
USA 4,5 1,S 775 6 5.25 6 9.5 12 IJ 12 8,5 . ., a 
hpaa 4.2.S 9 9 6,5 6j 4.25 3,5 6,25 7,25 5,5 5,5 5 5 
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Belriffl s 7,75 8,75 6 9 9 6 10,S 12 15 11 .s 10 11 
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Scbweiz 3,75 4,.5 5,5 3 2 1,5 I 2 3 6 4J 4 4 
Tilr.tel 9 8.75 9 9 9 9 10 10,75 26 JJJ JI ,5 43.5 '2 
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App.I/Table 2: Rates of Inflation (consumer price indices) 
oECD countries without Australia and New Zealand 
---•· 
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App. I/Figure 1: Mean, standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation of inflation rates in the OECD 1972 - 1993 
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App.I/Table Ja: Rates of Unemployment in OECD countries 
(without Australia and New Zealand) 
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:.nCD £tzr 3,2 2,9 2,9 4,2 4,a 5,2 5,5 5,6 6,1 7,8 9,1 9,9 10,3 10,4 10,3 101 9,5 8,6 1,1 u 9 8,! 
JG 2,6 2,9 3 4.3 
' 
5,4 M .S,7 6,4 8,1 9,4 10,.3 10,7 10,9 10,8 10,6 9,9 9 IJ 9 u I.I 
' .S,6 4.9 .S,6 8..5 77 7.1 6.1 .S,8 7,1 7,6 9,7 9,6 7,5 7,2 7 6,2 
"·' 
.'l.J 5J ln" 6.! 6,5 6 
- I,• 1.3 I,• 1,9 2 2 2.3 2.2 2 2.2 2,4 2,7 2.7 2,6 2,1 2,8 2.5 2.3 2,1 ,.,..,,,,, 2,1 2.J 2.J 
o,,.,,i-~, .... 0,8 0,8 1,6 3,6 3,7 36 3..'l 3,2 2,9 4,2 5,9 7,7 7.1 7,2 6,4 6,2 6,2 56 5,1 4,j 4j •.5 
Pruuricb 2,8 2,7 28 4 4,4 4,9 .S,2 5.9 6,.3 7,4 8,1 8.3 9,7 10,2 10,4 IO..'l 10 9,4 9 9,4 10 10 
lnC 3,1 2,1 2,1 3.3 4,5 4,8 4,6 4.3 5,4 8..5 98 107 II.I ll.J II,• 10 I 8,1 6,3 5,9 ! 98 II 
kaGea 6,4 6,4 5,4 5,9 6,7 7,2 7.3 7S 7,7 S6 9,2 10,1 10,1 10.2 11,2 12,1 12.2 12.1 11,2 11.J 10 9,! 
Kawa 6,2 5,5 5.J 6,9 71 II 8,.; 7.• 7,.S 7,6 II 11,8 11,2 10..'l 9,5 sa 7,8 1,5 8 I 10.J 10.J 9,8 
O•.-rticb 1,1 l 1,1 1,7 1 7 l 6 18 l,7 1.6 2.1 3.2 3,8 3,9 4,2 •,5 49 4,7 4,3 4,7 
.S.I 5,• 5j 
&.i.;. 2,7 2,7 3 5 6,4 7,4 7,9 8,2 88 10,8 12,6 12.1 12,1 II 3 11,2 II 9,7 8 7_ 77 8.J 8,3 
C>,J 1111111rt 1,7 I.I 2,5 6 6 I 7,7 7,• 6,1 7 9,2 9,8 l0..5 10,2 9.J 8 a a.a 9,5 9,6 10.J 10 9..5 
Pi:mlla!ld 2,6 2.3 1.7 22 3,9 .'l,9 7.2 6 4,7 .S.I 5,4 ,... .S.2 5 5,4 .u 4,6 3.S 3,4 7.5 9 9 
Griocbenl, 2,1 2 2,1 2.3 I 9 1,7 l,S 1,9 2-S 4 58 7,8 S,I 7,8 7,4 7,• 77 15 7 2 86 98 II 
lalud 0,5 0,4 0,4 O,.'l O,.'l O.J 0,4 0,4 03 0.4 0,7 I I 3 09 0,6 0,5 06 11 I 7 I 6 2 
lrldd 5.4 11 4 16,9 20,8 18 13.7 7J 13,3 18,2 20,4 171 13,7 15.4 16,8 17 4 17.7 16.7 15,6 13,7 158 1',5 IL 
L'lllembar• 3 6,1 9,5 10,7 98 6,7 3,1 •,5 6-3 8.1 93 8,7 5,7 •,I 0,3 -0,1 I • 3,• I 1.3 I.J I 
l'lred•la.ade •,6 8 9,6 10.2 11,S 6.4 •,I 4,2 6.5 67 H 2,7 3.3 2.J 0 I -0 7 07 11 1,5 7 1.S 7.J 
l'Cor,,- •,7 76 8,9 12,3 8,8 9,2 79 51 II 13 7 11,2 8,• 64 5..'l 7.J 1.8 6.7 4,6 l,2 5.J 4 8 4,3 
P-c,rhlftl •,6 11,7 19.2 203 19,4 27,1 22,5 23.7 16 7 20 22,7 1,9 8,4 8..'l 8,.'l 7 5,7 5 46 4 •,J 4,8 
.. uioa 6.1 11,4 15,7 48 n 7,5 92 11.7 14 4 16,3 17S 20,6 21 9 21.S 20.6 19,5 17.J 16.3 16.J 15..5 I.S 14,5 
llch9tden 2,7 2.S 2 1 6 1,6 1,8 2,2 2,1 13 8 2.5 32 3.! 3 I 2,8 2,7 I 9 I 6 I 4 15 27 4,3 4.J 
l!lcbwtir 0 0 0 0,4 0,1 0,4 O.• 0,4 0,2 0,2 04 09 l I I 08 0,8 0.7 06 06 1,3 1.J I 
rntt• 7,6 7,9 114 11,7 1.9 7.5 78 9,1 11,6 11.6 12 3 12,1 11,8 11.J 10..'l 9.5 9 ll 10.2 10 4 11.5 13.J 13..'l 
.. edia11 2,90 3,70 2,90 490 .'l,90 6 55 565 5,,4.'l 615 1,15 9 8 35 780 7 50 7 20 6 4.S '4.S 5 70 711 A.JO 7,8 
11,1.W 3,44 4,54 5 69 644 6.24 6,48 5,85 6,10 7 40 ll 05 180 8.18 8,06 1 ao 718 6 n 6 9 6 44 7 16 1 n 7 49 
!IA 2,11 3,69 .'l,45 5;55 4,79 ' 2 4,53 .'l 08 4,99 5,56 5 •S 4 7 4,82 4 97 .s,u 4,63 4,34 • 04 • 15 4,01 •,15 
vx. 0,61 0,81 0,96 0,86 0,77 0,8.'l 0,78 0,82 0,67 0,69 0,62 0..56 0,60 0,64 0,72 0,68 0,68 0,63 0,58 0,52 0,.S, 
··-·-··---App. I/Table 3b: Rates of Unemployment - percentage deviation 
I 80 I 21 0,93 I 07 I 25 I 44 I 23 I I.S I 17 1.26 I 44 I 3 1,31 
0,32 0,22 019 026 0,36 0 46 061 0,69 0 67 0 7J 0,71 0,69 0,73 
0,78 0,60 0,53 l 43 1,43 I 3 I •3 125 I 13 I 07 I 07 I II 
0 49 0,24 I II I 28 I II I.JO I 49 I 44 I 29 I 7 
0 76 0,51 0,61 0,66 o,n 0 71 0 68 I 05 I 16 1.20 
0,61 0,66 0 95 0,99 I OJ 1.20 1,26 I 47 
0 l.'l 0,08 012 0 08 0,22 0,00 0.27 
1.57 I 94 1,67 2,16 2.33 2,21 1,99 2.04 
0,87 1,06 1,06 053 0,18 017 0 13 
I 34 0 67 0 33 0,30 0,98 0.97 0,98 
1,37 I 27 1,03 0,71 0,7• 
l 34 2,58 0,97 l 09 OJ6 
I 77 2,02 2,52 76 2,16 
0 78 0,36 0,43 0,38 
000 005 0 II 0 II 0.18 
I 40 1,43 1,41 
11 60 12 30 11,80 II.JO 
I 40 1,•9 1,47 
I 98 2 39 2.31 
0,27 0,27 0.31 0 31 
0,36 027 0,34 0 33 0.38 
0.52 039 088 092 
0,96 0,8.'l 1,20 I.JI 
0,90 070 073 1.38 1.4.S 
1,86 1,11 I 27 I 04 12.'l 1.31 
MW mean 
SA standard deviation 
VK coefficient of variation 
DA ... average deviation 
; . 
J I 
.. 
. . ,· 
''·" 
• 
_!. ;- ~- • : :· : ; ~ ~ e 
.,~=-~~~::::: =! 
. ~e3~, standard deviation and coefficient 
,.,;-::e::;:,lcy:::ent: rates in the OECD 1972 - 1993 
of 
.... ----------··· ----·- . ·-·-·-·--·-·-··-·--·---
• 
/ " / '-._ 
. . -····· ... ~.;::_ .. • .. ... ·······-·--·--···-····•-·-•-····· 
/ •---.......... /---· 
. -
... /· ~ ----·-··-·-··-···--··--·--·-···-~~ ..... ----·----··~-
• ~.-✓ ___ ,.- '
·, '-. - . ,,/' . . . . . -·--- ·-- ...• -· .... ········-······• ········· .. ···-·· .. ·-·· ·····--··········---
.. 
• 
: ,.,, .. 
! 'l' 
\r • 
.... 
...... 
• r 
• 
• 
• - •--•-~·----
. • ____ .-_.___...._. __ •1----
-•-·••--... 
• . .• - .• ·-·+--t---+---+--t--jf--f--+--f--l--.f--+--+--+--l'----1----1 
-•-MW 
-0-SA 
-•-VK 
:011n 
G'::.<lnda:rd deviat1· 
c-" .. ,. . on 
"-~~ .. c1ent of variation 
